It’s All About China: Why the United States Attacked Iran

Within the first fourteen months of Donald Trump’s second term, Washington first achieved a regime change in Caracas and then carried out missile strikes against Iran. Analysts at Teniz Capital released a report titled «It’s All About China: Why the U.S. Attacked Iran» outlining their interpretation of the underlying drivers of the conflict. Zhasulan Ospanov, Independent Director at Teniz Capital Asset Managenent LTD, shared his perspective on whether a large-scale confrontation between major powers is possible.

Your analysts concluded in the report that the missile strikes on Iran are linked to the broader confrontation between the United States and China. Could you elaborate on this view?

— In our assessment, Washington is far more focused on strategic competition with China than on issues such as human rights in Iran, drug trafficking in the Caribbean, or nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East. It is widely known that China imports the majority of its energy resources. Last year, the country imported 73% of the oil it consumed. Venezuela and Iran were two of the main sources of discounted oil for China. Beijing could effectively be described as a beneficiary of Nicolás Maduro’s regime in Venezuela. Last year, China purchased roughly 75–85% of Venezuela’s total oil exports—equivalent to $8–11 billion annually in discounted crude. In many cases, Beijing did not even pay in cash: the oil shipments were offset against outstanding debt. Venezuela currently owes China approximately $10–12 billion, the remaining balance of loans extended since 2000 through the China Development Bank.

With regard to Iran, China was importing roughly 1.4 million barrels of oil per day—more than 90% of Iran’s total exports. Tankers operated through a shadow fleet, accounting for more than 1,500 voyages per year, with GPS transponders switched off and falsified documentation disguising Iranian oil as Malaysian or Indonesian. Iran’s total oil revenue exceeded $4 billion per month, while China’s cumulative purchases of Iranian crude since 2021 are estimated at around $140 billion. It is reasonable to assume that once the conflict ends and a new government is established in Iran, China will lose its exclusive access to Iranian oil.

Does that mean China will now have to purchase oil at full market prices rather than at a discount?

— The loss of Iranian and Venezuelan supplies means China would need to procure roughly 2 million barrels per day at market prices. The additional cost to the Chinese economy could range from $7–15 billion annually. However, the key issue here is not financial but strategic vulnerability. In the event of a crisis around Taiwan, the United States would hold decisive influence over six of China’s seven largest oil suppliers—Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait, and now Venezuela and Iran. Russia remains the only major supplier relatively shielded from U.S. pressure due to land-based supply routes. Meanwhile, China’s strategic petroleum reserve is estimated at about 1.2 billion barrels, equivalent to approximately 104 days of imports.

Do you believe the rivalry between the world’s largest and second-largest economies could escalate into military conflict?

— A direct military conflict is unlikely. However, we are entering a period of strategic competition between the two most powerful countries in the world. This rivalry will unfold across multiple domains: technology, economics, education, industry, and soft power. In preparing for this long-term competition, the United States appears to be securing a multi-year strategic advantage. Access to energy resources will no longer be as straightforward for China as it was previously. The trade wars initiated by Washington last year are part of the same broader strategy — consolidating alliances and signaling to major global economic players the direction of U.S. policy.

Are the pressure tools used by the United States effective in dealing with Beijing?

— Undoubtedly, energy pressure strengthens Washington’s negotiating position. The dynamics of dialogue are changing: without discounted oil and with growing vulnerability in the Strait of Malacca—through which China receives the majority of its energy supplies—Beijing may become more flexible in negotiations.

The situation regarding Ukraine is more complex, but the logic remains similar. Since 2022, China has increased imports from Russia by 121%, while also supplying Moscow with critical dual-use goods. Washington has already imposed sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil and has threatened 100% tariffs on major buyers of Russian oil. A prolonged conflict in Ukraine benefits both Moscow and Beijing because it prevents Washington from fully focusing its strategic resources on Asia. However, if the United States demonstrates that it can constrain China’s energy supply—as suggested by the Venezuelan and Iranian precedents — it could alter Beijing’s stance regarding pressure on Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine.

In your view, who is the key strategist shaping the foreign policy of the White House?

— Without question, Marco Rubio. Trump appears to trust Rubio on foreign policy to such an extent that he has become the second person in U.S. history after Henry Kissinger to simultaneously serve as Secretary of State and Acting National Security Advisor. While serving in the Senate, Rubio promoted legislation targeting Huawei, called for strict sanctions related to Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and advocated restrictions on Chinese investments.

Rubio has repeatedly stated that the defining question of the 21st century will be what unfolds between the United States and China. In his view, China represents the most powerful and dangerous competitor the United States has ever faced, because—unlike the Soviet Union—it combines industrial, technological, and scientific strength simultaneously. I am confident that this anti-China strategic vector will remain a constant in U.S. policy regardless of which party occupies the White House, whether Republicans or Democrats. It is important to note that, unlike China, the United States has allies, which strengthens its position.